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PER SE ILLEGALITY FOR REVERSE PAYMENT PATENT
SETTLEMENTS?
DanielA. Crane*
Congratulations to Mike on a very fine book. I will confine my comments to Mike's chapter on patent settlements (Chapter 15), which I understand will also be coming out as an article in the Michigan Law Review.1
Patent settlements involving "reverse payments" are a huge topic on
which I and many others have spilled much ink already. 2 Representative
Bobby Rush (President Obama's erstwhile nemesis from Chicago's South
Side) has just introduced legislation that would ban reverse payments.' I
will not regurgitate my entire spiel on patent settlements here, but instead
just try to highlight my essential disagreement with Mike and others who
focus on reverse payment settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies as a special antitrust problem.
Mike would make reverse payments-where the branded drug company pays the generic to leave the market-presumptively illegal. The settling parties would have a rebuttal right to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the settlement in light of litigation costs, the generic's cash-strapped
financial position, the parties' information asymmetries, and a catch-all
reasonableness category. Mike contemplates, however, that courts might
eventually find that these kinds of justifications were too weak, insubstantial, or infrequent to justify allowing a rebuttal case and simply make reverse payments per se illegal.
My basic problem with Mike's approach-and others that focus on reverse payment settlements as a unique species of antitrust problem-is that
the social costs of anticompetitive patent settlements are only loosely correlated with the direction in which payment flows in the settlement. To
repeat a claim that I've made on many occasions, the social cost of allow*
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1. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Frameworkfor Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REv. 37 (2009).
2. See Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust
Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002); Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy
in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698 (2004).
3.
See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong.
(2009).
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ing patent settlements that involve a cessation of competition between the
branded and generic firm equals the social cost of the continuing branded
monopoly (at least the deadweight loss, but include the wealth transfers if
you like) times the probability that, but for the settlement, the generic
would have won the patent infringement action and entered the market in
competition with the branded firm.' There are also social costs to disallowing patent settlements, but let's put those aside for now.
What is the relationship between the social cost of cessation of competition between the branded and generic and the fact that the settlement
payment flows from the branded to the generic? Nothing, unless the fact
that the payment flows "abnormally" from the patentee-plaintiff to the
infringer-defendant necessarily evidences that the plaintiffs claim is weak,
which in turn means that the branded's probability of success in the infringement action is low and the social cost of the settlement is therefore
high. However, as I've explained at length elsewhere, there are good reasons-particularly given the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act-why
the payment flows in an "abnormal" direction even in a case in which
there is a high probability that the patentee would have won the infringement action (and, consequently, the social cost of the settlement is relatively low).6 In other words, the mere fact that a branded-generic settlement involves a "reverse payment" only weakly evidences the social cost
of the settlement.
So antitrust rules that focus on "reverse payment" settlements as a category run the risk of creating false positives, but they also run the risk of
creating false negatives to the extent that they focus the inquiry on the
direction in which consideration flows-a not terribly helpful spot. It is
often not hard to structure a branded-generic settlement in a way that does
not involve reverse payments but still involves the key ingredients of social cost-the cessation of meaningful competition between the two firms
and a low probability that a court would have enjoined the generic on patent infringement grounds. Scott Hemphill's empirical research on patent
settlements following some of the early negative decisions (like the Sixth
Circuit's Cardizem decision holding reverse payments per se illegal)'
shows that creative lawyers are capable of crafting settlement agreements
that have the same effects as the most pernicious reverse payment cases
but would pass unscathed under a rule focusing on reverse payments.

4. See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 2, at 770-76.
5. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
6. See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 2, at 770-76.
7. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
8. C. Scott Hemphill, Drug Patent Settlements Between Rivals: A Survey (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=969492.
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Indeed, I have little doubt that if the Rush bill passes, antitrust lawyers
will make a bundle of money restructuring patent settlement agreements to
comply with the law. Here are some suggested reverse payment ban
avoidance schemes:'
* Branded retains Generic to become its exclusive manufacturing and
distribution agent for the branded's authorized generic. Utilizing its newfound freedom under Leegin,o Branded sets the resale price of the generic
at an appropriate price-discriminatory discount off the branded price but
nonetheless a monopoly price. Branded continues to collect monopoly
rents by making generic pay an exorbitant royalty or annual lump-sum fee.
If Generic can't afford the payments up front, Branded provides financing.
* Branded grants Generic an exclusive license to manufacture and
distribute under the patent in Canada. Generic charges a monopoly price
in Canada (so no one bothers re-importing), Branded charges a monopoly
price in the U.S. There doesn't need to be any explicit agreement that Generic won't enter the U.S.-they get the point.
* The Schering scheme" -Generic licenses or sells Branded some
worthless other drug for which Branded pays Generic some huge price.
Investment bankers are paid to say the drug was worth it. Good luck litigating this as a reverse payment case-something like this worked in
Schering.
I could go on, but the basic point is that the creativity of high-paid
New York lawyers exceeds the foresight of anyone drafting legislation in
this area. As much as I agree with Mike that patent settlements involving
the cessation of competition between branded and generic firms are a big
problem, the focus on reverse payments is off the mark.

9.
In the online version of this symposium, Mike rightly noted that Congressman Rush's bill
would prohibit not merely cash reverse payments but also settlements where the ANDA filer "receives
'anything of value'" for discontinuing the manufacture of the drug. Posting of Administrator on behalf
of Michael Carrier to Truth on the Market, http://www.truthonthemarket.com/ (Apr. 1, 2009, 11:57
EST), available at http://www.truthonthemarket.com/2009/04/01/professor-carriers-response/ (quoting
H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). But in the first two examples of avoidance schemes I present
here, the generic continues to manufacture the relevant drug but does so at monopoly prices because of
royalty payment obligation. Those scenarios would not appear to be covered under the Rush bill. My
basic point is that any rule focusing on the consideration paid to the ANDA filer-rather than on
whether the patent infringement claim is strong or weak (which drives the social cost of allowing the
settlement)-misses the boat.
10.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). During the online
symposium, someone commented that Leegin applies only to vertical RPM, not to RPM between
competitors. Certainly, a court might decide that a license agreement between competitors including a
resale price maintenance provision exceeds the scope of Leegin. However, recall that under United
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926)-a decision that was under attack on Dr. Miles
grounds since the 1940s but has now received a new lease on life because of Leegin-a patent license
between competitors accompanied by a resale price maintenance provision is not per se illegal.
11.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005).
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